The New York Times has a good article on Davie Yermack's study of CEOs who make large gifts of stock and get outsized charitable contribution deductions reducing their income tax liablities. See Stephanie Strom, Study Says Gifts of Stock Precede Sharp Price Dips, NY Times, Mar. 5, 2008 and David L. Yermack, Deductions Ad Absurdum: CEOs donating their own stock to their own family foundations (Feb. 22, 2008).
The gist of the story is this: the article finds that CEOs and chairmen of the boards of large public companies exploit the income tax charitable deduction provisions to time their gifts to great personal advantage. Their gifts of company stock tend to occur right before the price of the stock drops sharply. This is especially true for contributions by CEOs to their own private foundations.
As Yermack says, there's a real tax benefit to this approach.
Charitable gifts of stock allow the donors to take a personal income tax deduction for the market value of the shares, while also nullifying the capital gains tax that would be due if the shares were sold. Id.
Remember--that's market value, not basis or real economic investment. A CEO might have shares with very little investment but worth millions. The deduction is for the millions the shares are worth, not for the peanuts the CEO has invested in those shares. It's a paper deduction, in other words.
And in many of these cases discussed by Yermack, it is not even the case that the CEO could have sold those shares (paying the tax, of course) and then donated the same amount of cash to the charitable foundation (getting a tax deduction for the cash donated). (That transaction isn't equivalent in terms of the tax benefit, since there's that pesky capital gains tax on the sale, but it's worth considering how the charitable contribution deduction works to their benefit even more in these time periods when sales are restricted.) Since these types of donations aren't constrained by insider trading laws, CEOs can make donations even in time periods when they are prohibited from making sales. So they can make charitable contributions at a time right before the price is going to drop, get a deduction for that high price, and then watch the price drop as they knew it would. Because of the restrictions, they could not otherwise have gotten the benefit of the high value, since they couldn't sell them before the drop. So the charitable contribution deduction is quite a windfall for these already wealthy CEOs and Board chairs.
Yermack looked at 151 stock gifts to family foundations of at least $1 million each made by 91 CEOs and board chairs between mid-2003 and year-end 2005, aggregating in total $728 million (and amounting to about one-quarter of the stock gifts made by CEOs and board chairs during that period). He found that, on average, the gifts were made following runups, at price peaks just before sharp drop-offs in prices. To compare, he also looked at gifts to institutions other than family foundations--those were well-timed, but the typical price decline after those gifts was "significantly less well pronounced." In looking at the timing, Yermack found that some gifts were made just before adverse quarterly earnings announcements, while others were made just after positive quarterly earnings announcements. When he considered backdating possibilities, he found that "[t]ests used to infer the backdating of executive stock option awards yield results consistent with the backdating of CEO family foundation stock gifts." Id. He concludes that these results parallel tax fraud cases where donors were found to give to art musuems at inflated values (with the collusion of the museums) for inflated tax deductions.
Does this remind you of my recent posting on the continuing problem of donors inflating their charitable contribution deductions to art museums? See this post.
Yermack notes the popularity of family foundations where donors can get an immediate (and substantial) tax benefit for transferring assets to organizations over which they continue to exercise control. He found that most of the family foundations in the sample retained the stock for long periods, allowing the donors to exercise control, whereas a prudent investment strategy would have called for diversification.
Let me summarize:
- CEOs and chairmen of the board are maximizing their charitable contribution deduction (and minimizing their federal income tax liability) by taking advantage of their insider knowledge about upcoming drops in price, after which the contribution won't be worth so much to them.
- Some CEOs commit tax fraud by backdating these "gifts" to get the advantage of the higher charitable deduction.
- These gifts to the CEO's own private foundations, don't really require them to give up much-those foundations hold the stock for long periods, without diversifying; and the CEOs continue to vote the stock as they did before it was donated.
This is just one more example of the problem with our current charitable deduction. We need a number of reforms in this area, but the obvious one, that I have espoused from the beginning of my discussion of this issue, is to limit the charitable deduction to the contributor's after-tax investment (i.e., tax basis) and to require clear and convincing evidence of that basis before any deduction is allowed.
Donees will complain, as they have whenever this reform is broached, that not allowing wealthy people to get the full value of the deduction will dry up their main source of contributions. But there are several answers to this. First, it may not be empirically true. As Yermack notes in his study, wealthy people donate for many reasons---helping an institution that benefits them because it is integral to the social and cultural events in which the wealthy participate (museums, the arts, etc.); gaining status by being known as an important donor (just look at the "naming occasions" used by fundraisers to generate interest); and even satisfying their altruistic impulses to share some part of the wealth they have accumulated with others.
Second, even if contributions do decrease, there would be more tax monies that could be used to support public goods chosen by the people acting through their representatives. The advantage of this is that the public goods supported should represent a larger spectrum of interests than those supported by the wealthiest donors. Of course, wealthy donors will still be able to exert unusual influence in Congress and will have access that others do not have, so they will likely still have a greater say in the direction of those activities than ordinary Americans.
Third, this is a period of enormous fiscal stresses-- more than $9 trillion in U.S. government debt; huge deficits and nearing an all-time high; millions of children without basic health care, while Bush vetos needed funding for S-CHIPS; millions of baby boomers reaching retirement age and needing, in some cases, societal assistance to live a decent old age; tax evasion by wealthy Americans (the Liechtenstein tax evasion problem affecting Europe and the US as well as other countries); a tragically mistaken war in Iraq that is estimated to cost at least $2 trillion or even $3 trillion--see Democracy Now interview with Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, co-authors of The Three Trillion Dollar War-- when most costs are taken into account (including caring for the thousands of injured soldiers who will need long term disability benefits and medical care, and paying the interest on the debt required to have a war while having tax cuts for the wealthy too). We cannot any longer justify the system of favorable taxation of the wealthy in this country that has developed over time. Their increasing wealth over the last decade has meant growing inequality and consequent harm to democratic institutions. Their wealth has grown through an economy that works for them, with CEO salaries rising astronomically, but doesn't work for ordinary Americans and with the benefit of tax cuts for them financed by increases in debt for future generations. Meanwhile, most ordinary Americans have seen wages stagnate (or actually decline in real terms) and inflation, currently being downplayed by the Fed, has made life much more difficult for ordinary Americans as the price of food, shelter, and oil continues to rise.
It's time to change this. But will Congress have the guts to do it?
PS This isn't the first study that Yermack has done on big public companies that reveals that their various perks to executivies do a lot of good to executives and not so much good for the companies. IN 2004, he studied 237 big companies, looking at the ones that provide personal private jets to their CEOs. He found a "dramatic link"--companies that provide free jets to CEOs perform noticeably worse than ones that don't. See Collision Detection, April 13, 2004.
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