BloggingStocks thrills that "Before the bell: Stock futures jump on Geithner's plan to buy toxic assets," Mar. 23, 2009, as investors look positively on the plan to "clear as much as $1 trillion of the toxic debt off bank balance sheets." Wall Street Journal headline blares "Toxic-Asset Plan Sends Stocks Soaring: Dow jumps nearly 500 points on unveiling of public-private program to buy up to $1 trillion in soured loans and securities", Mar. 24, 2009. The front page article shows Tim Geithner at the Wall Street Journal Future of Finance Initiative, and a chart with the day's stock ticker soaring upwards. Here's the Dow ticker for Mar 20-Mar 24 closing (showing that Monday's euphoria wore off a little on Tuesday with profit-taking).
What's the plan, and why did Wall Street like it so much?
The plan involves the government setting up an arrangement for purchasing toxic waste off banks' books (Paulson's original idea). What would unaided investors pay for this toxic waste right now? A price very much discounted from face value--after all, there's a reason it's called toxic waste, and that reason is the sky-high foreclosure rate on the mortgage loans backing up the "assets" in the securitization pools. There's good stuff (that's the mortgages on the wealthy who aren't under water) and there's bad stuff (that's mortgages on ordinary guys who are losing their jobs and their homes at the same time). It's the bad stuff that the banks want to get rid of, of course, not the good stuff. So why hasn't that waste been sold long ago for a discount price, like desperate department store "the holidays are here" crappy merchandise at after-Christmas sales? Because the banks are holding on--they want a price closer to face value, and they think if they hold on long enough the federal government will ensure they get it. After all, the economy depends on it.....
So, for example, we have assets with face of 100, which the banks don't want to let go for less than 80 and nobody wants to buy for more than 40. In real markets, the banks would sell for what they can get without a subsidy from the government. What would happen here, if the banks didn't think they'd eventually get a subsidy from the government? Many banks might have to sell because of liquidity needs. The waste would go off their books, but some of the big ones might be very close to insolvent. The deals would reveal what the market really thinks, and it might force some of the banks to go out of business. The banks know that the government is afraid to let that happen, after the Lehmann Brothers experience.
Big Banks are powerful. And one way or another, they seem to be managing to get both the Bush administration and the Obama administration to give them the same obeisance. They are holding out for federal subsidies.
And the current Geithner Plan seems to give them exactly what they (and the big private equity firms with lots of cash on their hands) were looking for. So "The Geithner Private-Public Partnership: The cure may be worse than the disease!, BloggingStocks.com, Mar. 24, 2009, notes that
Here's how the plan gets around the no willing buyer-no willing seller impasse. Treasury puts some of the TARP funds (say, $100 billion) in a "public-private investment program" that is going to bid on the toxic waste. Somebody with cash--likely a group made up primarily of private equity firms--matches those funds. Somebody with cash (also likely private equity firms) lends the public-private investment program the money to buy the toxic waste, backed by a guarantee from the federal government. The private investors have an incentive to let the price bid go up more than they otherwise would have--because the government is going to pick up any loss beyond their actual equity stake, and they are going to pick up almost all of the upside. See, e.g., Mike Madden, Pay no attention to the Treasury secretary behind the curtain, Salon.com, Mar. 24, 2009;
The banks love it--they get their higher-than-market-value price up front. They win no matter what, without having to wait to see how the economy pans out. The private equity firms and other investors love it--they are not likely to lose much, with the federal guarantee taking the lion's share of any loss, and they could make a killing. (But they don't have any qualms about using the government's obvious need for their ready cash to protect themselves from any bonus tax bill or other compensation limits, and Geithner has already agreed! See U.S. Toxic Asset Plan Needs Hedge Fund, P.E. Backing, Mar. 23, 2009.) If the economic future of this country isn't too blighted and we pull out of this Deep Recession before too long, the taxpayers might just get their money back as well as a little bit of upside. So the government acts as the money bags for the private equity "masters of the universe" whose big deals are a part of the reason for the mess, as a way to "save" the banks and get the financial juices flowing again, like "normal" (meaning, too much credit?), for businesses and homeowners and the economy in general. In the process the banks get a good bit higher price than the true current market value, because the fed is ponying up part of the money and the auction bid is backed by the federal guarantee. What's not to love? This is a made-for-Wall Street deal.
Paul Krugman,in his blog Despair over financial policy, Mar. 21, 2009, suggests that the "zombie idea" that toxic waste is really worth more than zane investors would pay for them are fundamentally a view that we can just kickstart the financial system back to where it was, because "there's nothing fundamentally wrong" with it. The result, though, is that Treasury itself will have skewed the incentives by offering nonrecourse loans to investors that overbid so that banks' balance sheets can look good. Then the next day his op-ed column again roundly condemned the "cash for trash" policy: Financial Policy Despair, Mar. 22, 2009.
Doug Roberts notes, in The Geithner Private-Public Partnership, The cure may be worse than the disease!, BloggingStocks.com, Mar. 24, 2009:
[T]he government appears ready to create substantial incentives for these private investors to purchase at higher prices, possibly including non-recourse loans and government guarantees. This assumes that the banks are right, and these assets will eventually return to higher values. However, suppose that the investors are right, and these assets are worth very little. We are merely paying private investors and banks with taxpayer funds to postpone the inevitable write-down of these assets.
Brad deLong, I think Paul Krugman is Wrong, Mar. 22, 2009, disagrees. He suggests that the Geithner approach is politically necessary, even if nationalization of banks ultimately is required. (The comments are a must-read on this post.)
Doug Mataconis collects Krugman's, Galbraith's, and Stiglitz's responses to the Geithner Plan on his Below the Beltway blog, Economists Against the Geithner Plan, Mar. 24, 2009. Galbraith and Stiglitz use even stronger language than Krugman. Galbraith says the banks will benefit from their own fraud--"fraud in the inducement, fraud in the conveyance, and fraud in the ratings process." Stiglitz says the plan is outright "robbery of the American people."
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