I. FASB rules for accounting for special purpose vehicles:
The Financial Standards Accounting Board yesterday voted on a measure to rein in the "qualifying special purpose entities" that banks (and other companies) used to do securitizations, --i.e., vehicles that permitted the banks to get "offbook" treatment that made them look better than they actually were to investors, since they often retained control and considerable risk of loss. The FASB will approve new principles-based standards for determining whether a company "controls" a variable interest entity and thus whether it can be deconsolidated. As noted in the "Briefing Document" (linked below), the FASB noted a problem with the current practice of permitting determinations of proper deconsolidation only when special triggering events occurred,
Under existing guidance, as expected credit losses increased significantly due to unpredicted market events, some companies did not reconsider whether they should consolidate a variable interest entity. The new standard requires a company to update its consolidation analysis on an ongoing basis. Briefing Document: FASB Statement 140 and FIN 46(R), fasb.org, May 18, 2009.
Additional disclosures will also be required, to increase transparency of these vehicles.
The new standards will also eliminate the automatic deconsolidation of certain "qualifying special purpose entities".
The second standard now headed for finalization—Statement 140—enhances information reported to users of financial statements by providing greater transparency about transfers of financial assets and a company’s continuing involvement in transferred financial assets. It removes the concept of a qualifying “special-purpose entity” from U.S. GAAP, changes the requirements for derecognizing financial assets, and requires additional disclosures about a transferor’s continuing involvement in transferred financial assets. Briefing Document: FASB Statement 140 and FIN 46(R), fasb.org, May 18, 2009.
This is clearly a step in the right direction, including the fact that the rules, expected to be effective in 2010, will apply to existing entities as well as to newly created ones. There has long been a disjunct between the tax analysis of these deals (whether a transaction is a financing or a sale) and the accounting analysis as financing or sale. The tax analysis looks at all the facts and circumstances to determine the substance of the transaction, whereas accounting has too often been satisfied with satisfying a few objective criteria (that can often be manipulated through swaps and other derivative instruments that undo the appraent lack of involvement). That is one of the many reasons that I have objected to the Bush Treasury's determination to permit mark-to-market valuations for tax purposes based on a financial statement.
See also Appelbaum, Board to Ban Accounting Practice that Helped Lending Proliferate, Washington Post.com, May 18, 2009.
II. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund (BLIPS "economic substance" case in Fifth Circuit):
In another development in the ongoing saga about corporate tax shelter analysis in the federal courts, the Fifth Circuit joined a majority of other federal courts of appeal in holding that a tax plan can be derailed as failing the economic substance judicial doctrine when it lacks economic substance, without having to establish that tax avoidance was the sole reason the deal was undertaken.
The Klamath case involves the Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure (BLIPS). The BLIPS transaction used a foreign bank as an accommodation party (in this case, NatWest), and structured financings from the bank with a contingent liability (for $25 million) and a fixed liability that had an above-market interest rate. The liabilities were assumed by a partnership, and the partners claimed no reduction in basis for the contingent liabilities. Eventually, Euros were distributed in liquidation of the partnership and sold, and the partners claimed losses attributable to the artifically high basis. In the summary judgment case, the district court rejected the government's argument that the contingent liability would be treated as a liability under section 752, and invalidated the retroactive effect of new regulations under section 752 which define liability to include contingent liability, asserting that the law was "settled" under Helmer, 34 TCM 727 (1975), Long, 72 TC 1 (1978), and La Rue, 90 TC 465 (1988), in which the government successfully argued that partners got no basis increase for certain contingent liabilities. Eastern District of Texas summary judgment decision on issues other than economic substance in Klamath case, July 2006.
In the second opinion on the contested economic substance issue, the district court recognized the short-term planning evidenced in internal promoter documents (NatWest and Presidio) that made clear that the investors/partners would end their investment in the "nominal" seven-year strategy after 60 days and that the funds "invested" through the partnerships would be held by NatWest in short-term time deposits and not put at risk. A further giveaway--NatWest and Presidio treated the transaction as involving zero credit risk, and Presidio's management fee was based on the tax loss to be generated for the investors/partners on the 60-day exit. The court ruled that the "loans" lacked economic substance and were not loans at all, and any economic substance in the swaps was "illusory" because of the planned exit to generate losses. Accordingly, the partners were not entitled to the approximately $25 million in losses they had each claimed. (Note that the loss amount was approximately equal to the "loan premium" claimed not to be liability for partnership accounting purposes.)
Despite the literal terms of the documents, the court finds that Presidio, as the agent of and on behalf of Klamath and Kinabalu, entered into additional understandings and agreements with NatWest concerning the expected duration of NatWest’s lending relationship with individual investors, including Nix and Patterson. In addition, Presidio and NatWest understood that the Funding Amounts would not be used to provide leverage for foreign currency transactions. Finally, Presidio’s fee structure strongly suggests that Presidio’s goal was not to earn a profit, but rather to secure large tax losses for its investors.
Eastern District of Texas decision on economic substance and penalties, Klamath Strategic Investment Fund LLC v. U.S., 99 AFTR2d 2007-850 (Jan 31, 2007).
However, the district court basically treated the investors/partners as ignorant of the tax advantages of exiting this "investment" as they did until after the fact, and held that they were not liable for various penalties (gross valuation mistatement, substantial valuation mistatement, or substantial understatement of income taxliability or negligence/disregard of rules). The court also ruled that it had jurisdiction over a reasonable cause defense on behalf of the partnership in the suit for readjustment of partnership items under section 6226 (even though it would be the partners who ordinarily would claim reasonable cause as a defense in their own refund proceedings), and ruled that the partners satisfied its requirements, so that no accuracy-related penalties could be imposed. It also allowed the taxpayers to deduct operational expenses and ordered a refund of taxes based on a $250,000 management fee paid to their accountants.
On May 15, 2009, the Fifth Circuit, on appeal of the economic substance decision, affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. The court ruled that the Government lacked standing to appeal the section 752 issue (and the ruling that the regulation cannot apply retroactively), since it won anyway on economic substance grounds. It rejected the Fourth Circuit's Rice's Toyota World test for economic substance, concluding that lack of substance was sufficient even if the taxpayer professes to have a genuine business purpose, and considered only the question whether the purported loans would be invested, disregarding the actual, "collateral" investments made with the additional $1.5 million contributed by the partners. Otherwise, the court notes, it would "reward a 'head in the sand' defense where taxpayers can profess a profit motive but agree to a scheme structured and controlled by parties with the sole purpose of achieving tax benefits for them."
The court decided that the district court did not err in allowing the partner'ss reasonable cause and good faith defenses to be asserted in the partnership proceeding on behalf of the partnerships. Because the government had not asserted that the district court's decision was wrong on the merits of the defense, the Firth Circuit affirmed that no penalties would apply.
The District Court's decision was vacated on the question of deductions for interest and operating expenses, and remanded for reconsideration. No deduction for interest expenses is permissible, because the purported loans were not indebtedness, and the payments of purported interest are not deductible interest payments under section 163. similarly, if the other expenses are not made in connection with an investment undertaken with a profit motive, those expenses would not be deductible under section 212. The court held that the determination must be made in regard of Presidio, rather than in terms of the 90% partners who were able to generate tax losses, as done by the district court. It also held that a district court may not order a refund in a section 6226 readjustment action and vacated that determination.
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