A press release Thursday from the corporatist Washington "think" tank, NDN (New Democratic Network), announced a new study : the study supports allowing huge multinational enterprises (MNEs) to repatriate their overseas earnings at almost zero tax.
The study relies on some questionable assumptions and, I believe, comes to a wrong conclusion. Even without repatriation, the combination of the foreign tax credit and US MNEs' ability to manipulate their income results in very low tax rates on repatriated income. With repatriation, the tax rate may even be negative. There are almost no benefits that accrue to the US from repatriation, while the benefits to MNEs are substantial.
The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that another rendition of the 2004 repatriation provision (part of the cornucopia of corporate tax benefits passed by the Bush Administration and responsible for lowering even further the tax-haven effective tax rates actually paid by US corporations) will cost about $80 billion over the ten years from 2011 to 2021.
Yet a corporate coalition--the alliance that has been pushing repatriation for months, on grounds of increasing 'competitiveness' and 'job creation'-- and their corporatist allies in Congress (especially on the right) are nonetheless pushing passage of a new "one-time" repatriation provision. (The fact that the original repatriation provision was also a "one-time provision" and yet they are lobbying for a second iteration is something easily glided over in this age of reckless legislating.)
This is all occurring at a time when the rightwing GOP in the House and Senate has pushed to reduce US spending for social justice programs like Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security on the claim that its highest priority is reducing the US deficit. That right-wing fringe refuses tax increases--even to restore the series of huge Bush tax cuts that moved us from surplus to deficit--and it engaged in economic terrorism to walk to the cliff edge on default on the US debt in order to get the kind of spending cuts it wanted.
The repatriation study is by "economic consultants" Robert Shapiro & Aparna Mathur (American Enterprise Institute), The Revenue Implications of Temporary Tax Relief for Repatriated Foreign Earnings: An Analysis of the Joint Tax Committee's Revenue Estimates, NDN (Aug. 25, 2011).
NDN styles itself as 'progressive' and in some senses it is--the organization appears to be interested in the concerns of ordinary Americans for jobs and income and decent health care But on core issues, such as globalization, corporatism, and the relative priority of protecting social justice programs versus 'reforming' the corporate tax code, the organization ends up supporting a Clintonesque right-of-center position that is far short of progressive. Shapiro, one of the co-authors, is on record as supporting the right-of-center, non-progressive Simpson-Bowles and Rivlin-Domenici approach to the U.S. fiscal problems--cut entitlements (probably significantly), cut defense (probably limited compared tot he entitlement cuts) and raise revenues (but not from corporations). See Shapiro's blog postings for NDN, here. His co-author is an American Enterprise Institute econometrician. The study seems to reflect more the pro-corporatist agenda of that institute than anything progressives should stand for.
Regrettably, the self-designated moniker of 'progressive think tank' may well mislead those interested in tax policy into thinking that progressives should support an additional repatriation holiday. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Just look at the way the Wall Street Journal glommed onto the 'study' as support for the tax cut for multinationals that it has been pushing since the last one in 2004. McKinnon, Study Finds Benefits in Temporary Tax Break for Multinationals, Wall St. Journal (Aug. 24, 2011). The Journal's description of the MNE coalition's effort for even further reduction in their already low, US-tax haven for MNE-rates is succinct and accurate (though no corporation pays the statutory 35% rate, and certainly not multinationals, who finangle their repatriation of foreign-taxed income to ensure the maximum foreign tax credit, thus reducing to a very low rate their tax rate on the overseas earnings (which are often really US earnings that are flushed overseas with transfer pricing gimmicks that the Congress should outlaw).
"A coalition of U.S. multinationals including Cisco, Apple, Google, Microsoft and Pfizer has been pushing Congress to pass the temporary tax break, which would sharply lower U.S. tax rates on overseas income from as much as 35% now to as little as 5% or so. The companies argue such a move would induce companies to bring home hundreds of billions of dollars in profits that could be used for new investment and hiring as well as dividends, stock repurchases and debt reduction."
But evaluation of the arguments in the paper suggest it is not particularly persuasive. I've written about this extensively here and elsewhere (see my SSRN article on democratic egalitarianism and corporate taxation, here). There are deep flaws in the idea, and equally deep flaws in the Shapiro-Mathur study. I'll outline a few of them here.
For those needing a primer on the value of deferral in the US system for taxing MNEs' on their worldwide income, you may find the Dec. 2000 Treasury study entitled "The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study" on subpart F helpful. It considered whether the US regime is anti-competitive and concluded that there was no evidence that it was.
[The study acknowledged that] promoting multinational competitiveness may conflict with the goal of promoting economic welfare. It then attempted to evaluate the effect of subpart F on competitiveness and concluded that the available data do not provide a reliable basis for evaluating whether subpart F has had a significant effect on multinational competitiveness. Although some have attempted to use statistics selectively in an attempt to show a decline in U.S. competitiveness, there is no convincing evidence of such a decline, nor is there convincing evidence regarding what impact, if any, subpart F may have had on these figures. Further, there are many other statistics that appear to show, generally, that the U.S. economy is highly competitive. Chapter 4 also noted that the U.S. tax regime imposes a lower overall tax burden than that imposed in many other OECD countries.
And possibly the most useful study on the effects of the earlier 2004 repatriation holiday is Thomas Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday? The Long-Term Effects of the Repatriation Provision of the AJCA, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 1 (2010).
So what are the arguments that need to be made on the issue of repatriation? A few ideas follow.
1. Much of the corporate earnings that are now 'retained' in controlled foreign corporation reinvestment are actually US earnings that have been moved overseas through transfer pricing gimmicks. Instead of providing another undeserved and unneeded tax break to US MNEs who already enjoy tax haven taxation under the US corporate code, Congress should stiffen the transfer pricing rules, including refusing to recognize a transfer of an intangible intellectual property asset (eg., patents) that lies at the core of a company's business. No company would sell its most essential intellectual property rights to an unrelated third party. The only rationale for the sale to a controlled foreign corporation is to avoid US taxation on the value of a patent that was developed in the US with US subsidies (R&D credits, public sponsorship of university research that underlies the intellectual property, etc.).
2. Even 'retained' earnings aren't usually 'retained' overseas by investing in overseas operating assets--they are mostly invested in (US dollar-denominated) financial assets--in bank deposits, in securities, etc. See, e.g., Bryant-Kutcher et al, Taxes and Financial Assets: Valuing Permanently Reinvested Foreign Earnings , National Tax Journal (arguing from a corporatist position that the US worldwide tax system 'forces' companies to reinvest in financial assets, which really isn't good for their businesses).
In other words, if having corporate profits be brought back tax free and distributed to wealthy shareholders who don't need to spend them and instead invest them at least to some extent in US dollar-denominated financial assets like stocks, bonds, and derivatives is a positive for the US economy (an argument in the Shapiro-Mathur paper), then having controlled foreign corporations of US MNEs invest their 'retained' earnings in US financial assets is just as good. The US economy gains very little, if anything, in new investments by having MNEs get a huge tax break on making more cash available to distribute to shareholders through dividends and buy backs (the major use of the repatriated earnings in the 2004 corporate tax break)--it just changes the owner of the investment from corporation to corporate shareholder. (US shareholders may be even more likely to invest those surplus dollars in emerging markets, taking them out of the US economy...)
3. Since Congress gave in to the incessant MNE lobbying for the first repatriation holiday (which was supposed to be the 'only one' ever), MNEs and their funded lobbying and propaganda tank compadres have been pushing for another one. Accordingly, while the MNEs profits have soared (so the dollar amount of repatriated earnings hasn't decreased by significant amounts), retained earnings abroad have soared even more since the 2004 repatriation holiday. See, e.g., Citizens for Tax Justice, Data on Top 20 Companies Using Repatriation Amnesty Calls Into Doubt Claims of New Democrat Network (August 26, 2011) (noting that the top 20 companies now have about triple the amount of profits held offshore than at the end of 2005); a PricewaterhouseCoopers description of accounting for deferred taxes on permanently reinvested earnings notes that a 2009 study of 300 MNEs showed a per-company mean of $3.74 billion, for a total at that time of $1.02 trillion. Deferred Taxes on Foreign Earnings: A Roadmap (PwC, Dec. 2010); Brennan, op.cit (in a rigorous statistical analysis using publicly available data, finding that there has been an "increase in overseas investment" and that "findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the cash inflow to the United States of repatriated funds [from the 2004 repatriation provision] has already been substantially offset by the increased levels of foreign earnings being permanently reinvested overseas in the wake of the AJCA" and that there has been a "dramatic increase in the rate at which firms add to their stockpile of foreign earnings kept overseas") (emphasis added. Today, that total amount is likely closer to $1.3-1.4 trillion.
In anticipation of winning the lobbying campaign, even those companies that had been good citizens prior to the first repatriation holiday have not regularly repatriated cash, and those that were already bad citizens have been even worse (and are leading the coalition to argue for yet another tax break). Cisco, Google, and those who can most easily manipulate where their earnings are located because their greatest value lies in their intangible assets are, not surprisingly, the culprits in this scenario.
The lesson here--that unless Congress sticks with its 2004 conclusion that this had to be a one-time only tax break, it will have enacted the most foolish reform to the corporate and international taxation scheme imaginable, without even thinking it is doing so. The repatriation holiday, if reenacted, will become an 'expected' part of the Code, just like the supposedly temporary AMT patches, the active financing exception for banks, the R&D credit, accelerated depreciation and on and on. Because corporations will expect these tax breaks to be repeated they will behave accordingly. Even greater percentages of income will be moved abroad under transfer pricing gimmicks and whatever is brought home will come almost tax-free. Corporate tax revenues will be much less than they should be without the foolish provision. Ed Kleinbard, former chief of staff for the Joint Committee on Taxation, called the regular acquiescence in the MNE demand for a repatriation holiday "a cartoon version of a territorial system, without safeguards of any kind, and with the ability to shelter interest and royalty income from foreign subs with FTCs [foreign tax credits] (which no territorial system would allow)." See Kleinbard's article on The Lessons of Stateless Income (2011).
4. The primary goal of repatriation is supposedly job creation with the 'new' influx of money to corporations. But that simply didn't happen in 2004, as various studies show. Many of the biggest repatriators, such as Hewlett Packard, actually cut tens of thousands of jobs at the same time. The primary use of repatriated cash was to do stock buybacks or pay dividends. IN other words, the money primarily went to shareholders, not new workers.
5. The study claims that the 2004 repatriation provision "should" ultimately generate more tax revenues than it lost and therefore supports the enactment of a similar repatriation scheme. The nature of that claim has to be questioned--is the data inadequate to support it? have key aspects of the analysis been carried out in a way that biases the outcome? The answer here has to be yes to both of these questions, suggesting that the study is more in line with the propaganda pieces typically produced by the American Enterprise Institute and similar organizations than some 'nonpartisan' piece that merits attention.
The study claims the JCT analysis of huge tax losses from repatriation provisions is flawed because it assumed that the prospect of future additional repatriations would lead more MNEs to i) retain more earnings abroad and ii) offshore even more of their earnings to foreign CFCs. The study claims these assumptions are flawed because i) the amount repatriated didn't go down as steeply as one might have expected and ii) there is 'no evidence" that foreign direct investment accelerated as a result of the 2004 act.
What's wrong with these points? A lot. While the amount of repatriated earnings may have stayed fairly high after the 2004 repatriation provision, the amount of unrepatriated earnings has about doubled just since the 2004 act. The study is comparing dollar amounts rather than rates of repatriation of earnings, and thus obscuring the fact that the impact of the repatriation provision was to encourage companies to retain more foreign earnings as permanent reinvestments. If earnings increase offshore (which may in part reflect even better use of the transfer pricing gimmick) then companies can retain ever larger amounts offshore while still repatriating about the dollar amount they were prior to the 2004 act. The important statistic is the rate of earnings retention abroad, not the dollar amount of earnings repatriated. And various studies have shown that companies are retaining more abroad (see above).
Further, the study's estimates the tax revenues from amounts that are repatriatedare questionable. See the discussion of the assumptions made in estimating the tax revenues from repatration at page 12 et seq. The treatment of the foreign tax credit seems particularly so. The report acknowledges that the foreign tax credit can reduce repatriated income tax to less than zero, noting that a Treasury study by Grubert shows that the majority of U.S. MNEs face negative effective tax rates on repatriated dividend income even without the special repatriation provision. The report nonetheless claims this aggregate data doesn't give a good enough picture, since some firms may not be able to use the technique of repatriating dividends only from high-tax jurisdictions to maximize use of foreign tax credits. Accordingly, the report uses other studies of the foreign tax credit to substantially reduce the impact of the foreign tax credit on the tax revenues from repatriation and conclude that repatriated dividends are ordinarily taxed at a rate of around 10% even after the foreign tax credit. That is, two studies suggested an effective tax rate after foreign tax credits of 3.3%. Another "broader" study suggested an effective tax rate after foreign tax credits of 10.26%. Even while acknowledging the study showing that the majority of companies have a negative effective tax rate after taking the foreign tax credit into account and two other studies showing at most a rate of 3.3%, given the ability of most companies to avoid taxation through repatriation of high taxed income and application of foreign tax credits, the report nonetheless used that latter figure of a 10.26% effective tax rate on repatriated income as the 'normal' effective tax rate for repatriated income when there is no special repatriation provision! See pp. 13-15 discussing foreign tax credits. Accordingly, the report's assumptions about the impact of the low repatriation tax provision are skewed by its assumptions about the tax rate on repatriations without the provision.
Here's a sentence from page 2 of the report (comments following):
To minimize the lock-out effect that discourages U.S. multinationals from deploying these earnings in the United States and to provide those. corporations with low-cost resources to expand their domestic workforces and investment, the legislation would offer U.S.-based multinationals a one-time deduction of up to 85 percent for "extraordinary dividends" paid by controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) to their U.S. parent companies, subject to certain limitations.
Note the inconsistencies here. First, this statement assumes that the already low tax on foreign earnings, when the foreign tax credit is taken into account, has a 'lock-out effect' --an assumption that is assisted by the report's unreasonable reliance on a 10.26% effective tax rate after foreign tax credits for normally repatriated dividend income. Yet that assumption seems inconsistent with the claim that repatriation has not decreased after the 2004 repatriation provision--i.e., a claim that there really hasn't been a lock-out effect. Second, note the assumption that the "low-cost resources" yielded by close to tax-free repatriation will be used to "expand [MNEs'] domestic workforces and investment". In fact, neither of these occurred when companies repatriated under the special repatriation provision in 2004: they generally used the money for dividends and stock buybacks and at the same time often conducted huge layoffs of workers. There are substantial studies to this effect, but the report merely terms the repatriation provision's effectiveness in generating new jobs a "matter of debate" among economists and relies on the repatriating companies' CFOs (who needless to say have a stake in having it thought that repatriation will create jobs) for 'evidence' that repatriation creates jobs.
Lloyd Doggett, the Democrat from Texas who been more determined than anyone to go after the corporatist provisions of the Code that permit big corporations to reduce what is on paper a statutory rate of 35% to very very low tax-haven rates of taxation, isn't buying the NDN's study.
“In fact, the JCT cost estimate of nearly $80 billion is likely too conservative and does not even address the full impact of a repeat of the 2004 corporate bonanza in lost jobs for hardworking Americans and windfalls for wealthy corporations and shareholders,” he said in a news release issued to The Hill.
“It is outrageous that large multinationals continue to push for their massive tax break that past experience demonstrates will not create jobs or help our economic recovery,” Doggett added. Becker, Texas Democrat Fires Back at Repatriation Study, The Hill (Aug. 25, 2011).
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